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We provide evidence indicating that countries with well-developed social security 
systems do not necessarily face a trade-off between social spending and 
competitiveness. On average, countries that spend a lot on social needs score 
well in the competitiveness league. We investigate the importance of a reverse 
causality from competitiveness to social spending, and find that this is weak. We 
also present some possible explanations for our empirical finding.  Finally, we 
interpret our findings in the framework of a theoretical model in which risk affects 
the size of the social sector and in which social spending affects the production 
function of the private sector. 
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1. Introduction 
There is an increasing perception that the forces of globalisation put the systems 
of social security in the rich countries at risk. Such a perception is based on an 
intuitive idea that social security is expensive as it raises the cost of labour. As a 
result, profit maximising firms tend to curtail their activities in countries with high 
labour cost and move to places where the cost of labour is low and where the 
social security system is less extensive. As rich countries open their markets to 
imports from countries with lower labour standards and lower wages, employers 
and governments in rich countries are forced to adopt similar low standards in 
order to remain competitive. These phenomena create pressures on the countries 
with well-developed social security systems to scale back on them. It is claimed 
that a ‘race to the bottom’ is set in motion, whereby the competitive pressures 
arising from globalisation slowly erode social security. If not controlled, this 
dynamics may destroy one of the great social achievements of industrialised 
countries – their capacity to guarantee a reasonable income to all citizens hit by 
unfavourable conditions.  
How serious is this race-to-the-bottom scenario? This is the question we address 
in this work and we show that the rich countries (we analyse a sample of the 
OECD countries) that are most competitive in the global marketplace are the 
same that spend most on their social needs. At the same time, we show that an 
increase in trade integration, and, therefore, a larger exposure to the international 
risk, does not have a clearly-cut effect on either the social spending or the 
competitiveness. We provide both the theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
problem. 
2. The facts 
It is useful to start from the facts. Globalisation is the process that has been 
observed for a prolonged period. In particular, after the Second World War richer 
countries have opened up to trade, unleashing t he forces of globalisation. A 
specially strong acceleration occurred in the last two decades, when an increasing 
number of countries opened up their borders. As a result, the end of the 20
th 
century brought about exposure of industrial economies to free markets in goods 
and capital, and to competition in global markets, stemming from both developed   3
and developing countries. How has social security fared in the industrialised world 
during this period? One way to answer this question is to analyse the trends in 
social spending. We do this in  Figure  1, which shows social spending (as a 
percentage of the GDP) in the OECD countries in 1980 and 1995. The most 
striking feature is that in almost all countries (except Norway) social expenditures 
have increased between 1980 and 1995. For the OECD area as a whole, social 
spending increased from 19.5% to 24% of GDP. Thus, if there is a race-to-the-
bottom, as claimed by the opponents of the globalisation, then this force has been 
rather weak in the recent past. 
 
Figure 1: Social spending in the OECD countries in 1980 and 1995. 
 
 
Clearly this evidence is only indicative. One could argue that globalisation forces 
have not yet reached their ultimate strength, and that in the future, the race-to-the-  4
bottom dynamics will operate with full force. There is an indirect way to check 
such a statement. Levels of social protection vary among industrial countries. 
Some of them, like Scandinavian countries, have gone very far in developing 
extensive and expensive systems of social security. Others, for example Southern 
European countries, are less advanced and elaborate in social protection. If the 
race-to-the bottom hypothesis is correct, one should observe that countries that 
spend a lot on social security pay a price in terms of competitiveness, and are 
increasingly confronted with the race-to-the-bottom syndrome. To check this, in 
the next section we analyse in detail the relationship between social expenditures 
and competitiveness. 
3. Social security and competitiveness 
Competitiveness has many dimensions
1. One of them is price competitiveness, 
which is determined mainly by the evolution of the domestic costs relative to the 
foreign ones. This is the dimension that critics have in mind when they argue that 
because social security increases labour costs, it also reduces competitiveness. 
There are other dimensions to competitiveness, however. These relate to the 
capacity of countries to innovate, to develop new products and technologies. 
These capacities are very much influenced by the quality and the motivation of the 
human capital of nations. Nations with a poor quality and motivation of their 
workers will not be innovative and, although their products may be cheap, will 
nevertheless demonstrate a poor level of competitiveness. 
The quality of the human capital and the motivation of people are influenced by 
the quality of the educational system and the rewards that workers obtain from a 
good education. Besides, the quantity and quality of physical capital, including 
collective goods (e.g. infrastructure) affects competitiveness. Finally and most 
importantly, competitiveness also depends on the quality of domestic institutions. 
Strong legal and social institutions (including social security) contribute to 
increasing the productivity of the workforce and reduce social conflicts, which are 
damaging to the economic prosperity in the long run. Effective and not corrupted 
                                            
1The "official" definition of OECD of a nation's competitiveness is "the degree to which a country 
can, under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services which meet the test of 
international markets, while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real incomes of its 
people over the long term".   5
governments, strong and fast execution of the laws, absence of constraints 
imposed  on private firms and entrepreneurial spirit  – all these and the earlier 
mentioned factors affect the competitiveness of nations. 
Quantitative information about competitiveness that includes various dimensions 
of this concept is not easy to construct. Two organisations, however, the IMD of 
Lausanne and the World Economic Forum, compute such indices and rank 
nations accordingly
2. These indices synthesise the different dimensions of the 
notion of competitiveness of nations (cost and price competitiveness, capacity to 
innovate, quality of human capital, efficiency of government sector, and other 
indicators). In such a set-up, competitiveness should be understood as the 
capacity of economies to sustain the forces driving the open world economy. As 
such, indices constructed by the IMD or the World Economic Forum measure the 
quality of institutions that make countries competitive, and therefore capabilities of 
economies to compete, rather than actual performances in the international 
markets (e.g. market shares or current account figures). We describe the rankings 
in more detail in appendix. 
We show the two aforementioned indices and compare rankings of the countries 
from our sample. This is done in Figure 2 and Table 1. We observe that, although 
the classification of countries in terms of their competitiveness is not the same, 
there is a reasonable degree of coherence between the two. The correlation 
coefficient between these two rankings is on average 0.8 (in 1999, 2000 and 
2001).  
 
                                            
2See World Competitiveness Report, IMD, Lausanne. These indices and the underlying 
methodology can be found on the website: www.imd.ch and Global Competitiveness Report 2001-
2002: www.weforum.org/pdf/gcr/Overall_Competitiveness_Rankings.pdf.   6
Figure 2: Scatter diagram of alternative indices of competitiveness. 
 
 
Table 1: The average IMD and WEF competitiveness rankings. 
IMD  1998-2002  WEF  1999-2001 
USA  1  USA  2 
Finland  2  Finland  1 
Netherlands  3  Netherlands  3 
Ireland  4  Ireland  17 
Switzerland  5  Switzerland  5 
Canada  6  Canada  9 
Denmark  7  Denmark  7 
Australia  8  Australia  10 
Sweden  9  Sweden  6 
Germany  10  Germany  4 
Norway  11  Norway  16 
UK  12  UK  8 
Austria  13  Austria  12 
New Zealand  14  New Zealand  15 
Belgium  15  Belgium  13 
France  16  France  11 
Spain  17  Spain  18 
Japan  18  Japan  14 
Portugal  19  Portugal  20 
Italy  20  Italy  19 
Greece  21  Greece  21 
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Next, we compare the competitiveness rankings with social spending by the 
OECD countries. Social spending includes spending on unemployment, disability, 
health care, pension, family services (including child benefits) and housing. We 
restrict the analysis to the OECD countries for three reasons. First, these are the 
only countries for which comparable data on social spending exist. Second, as 
was said in the introduction, we want to test the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ hypothesis 
that has been formulated by the globalisation critics. It applies to rich countries, as 
it says that globalisation will force the rich countries to contract their social 
spending and to move towards the system with minimum social spending that is 
prevalent in poor countries. 
Third, there exist large differences in the ways governments in poor and rich 
countries redistribute national income. Rich countries have well developed 
redistribution ‘infrastructures’. In these countries authorities address social needs 
through social expenditures. The contrary is true in poor countries, where 
redistribution is carried out through government consumption and where a job in 
the public sector or employment offered by public works constitute sources of 
income. 
Scatter diagrams and regression lines in Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the relation 
between the competitiveness indices and social spending. The regression results 
themselves are shown in Table 2 and Table 3. 
 
Figure 3: Social spending and IMD competitiveness index. 
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Figure 4: Social spending and WEF competitiveness index. 
 
 
The results suggest that there is a negative relation between the competitiveness 
ranking and social spending. It means that the countries that spend larger 
proportions of their domestic products on social needs also score best on the 
competitiveness scale (they have a low number in the ranking)
3. Note that we 
relate the average competitiveness during 1998-2002 (IMD) or 1999-2001 (WEF) 
to the social spending in 1997 (this is the last available  observation that is 
comparable across OECD countries). In so doing we minimize the potential for a 
reverse causality. Reverse causality would occur if the countries with a high 
competitiveness rank created more domestic value added (their domestic product 
would be higher) and that, in turn, allowed them to spend more on social needs. 
By regressing competitiveness on past values of social spending, we eliminate 
reverse causality as a possible explanation of the negative relations between 
social spending and competitiveness rankings. We return to this issue, however, 
because it can be argued that social spending does not vary much over time and 
that the reverse causality can easily re-emerge as a problem. 
                                            
3 Note that the US is the most notorious exception to this rule; it is ranked first (according to IMD) 
and second (according to WEF) in terms of competitiveness during 1997-2001 and spends 
relatively little on social security, i.e. only 17%, compared to about 30% in most Northern 
European countries. Figure 3 and Figure 4 make clear that the US is the exception to the rule. 
Nevertheless, the experience of the US has very much influenced the perception of the critics, who 
now claim that the US experience of high competitiveness and low social spending is a forebode 
of what globalisation will do in Northern Europe.    9
 
Table 2: IMD (average of 1998-2002) on social spending. 
Included observations: 21 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  24.912  7.6617  3.2514  0.0042 
social spending  -0.3725  0.3057  -1.2186  0.2379 
R-squared  0.0725  Mean dependent var  15.895 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0237  S.D. dependent var  9.2209 
S.E. of regression  9.1112  Akaike info criterion  7.3473 
Sum squared resid  1577.2  Schwarz criterion  7.4468 
Log likelihood  -75.146  F-statistic  1.4849 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.7683  Prob (F-statistic)  0.2379 
 
Table 3: WEF (average of 1999-2001) on social spending. 
Included observations: 21 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  27.980  7.4879  3.7367  0.0014 
social spending  -0.6025  0.2987  -2.0167  0.0581 
R-squared  0.1763  Mean dependent var  13.396 
Adjusted R-squared  0.1329  S.D. dependent var  9.5629 
S.E. of regression  8.9044  Akaike info criterion  7.3013 
Sum squared resid  1506.5  Schwarz criterion  7.4008 
Log likelihood  -74.664  F-statistic  4.0672 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.9107  Prob (F-statistic)  0.0580 
 
We also observe from the results shown in Table 2 and Table 3 that the negative 
relations between social spending and competitiveness ranking is stronger in the 
WEF sample than in the IMD one. In the former we obtain a significantly negative 
coefficient, while for the latter the coefficient is negative but statistically 
insignificant. Note that the relatively low R-squared implies that a lot of the inter-
country variation in competitiveness is left unexplained by focusing on social 
spending only. 
The statistical analysis presented in this section is very elementary and 
rudimentary. It is important to put these results in a broader theoretical framework. 
This will also allow us to control for other variables that can explain inter-country 
differences in competitiveness. 
4. Social spending, risk and competitiveness. 
The relation between social spending and the economy is a very complex one.   10 
The first thing to note is that most likely there is simultaneity in the relation 
between competitiveness and social spending, i.e. causality is likely to run in both 
directions. Thus, countries that are highly competitive generate a lot of value 
added (they have a higher GDP), what allows them to spend more on social 
needs. Conversely, high social spending may influence the productivity of workers 
and, through this channel, affects the competitiveness of nations. We would like to 
disentangle these two causal relations. 
Let us start from one of the theories analysing the determinants of social spending 
which was developed by Rodrik (1998a, 1998b). Rodrik asked the question of 
how countries decide to increase or to reduce social spending. His analysis can 
be summarised as follows. 
The decision to spend on social needs is based on several factors. First, the level 
of the income per capita matters. When income per capita increases, the desire to 
spend proportionally more on social needs increases. Thus, one should expect 
that rich countries have a relatively high level of social spending. In a way social 
spending can be called a “luxury” good, in the sense that the income elasticity of 
the demand for social spending exceeds one. This idea is a very old one. 
Second, fluctuations in the terms of trade are an important source of risk in open 
economies and lead to a greater demand for social spending. Since the external 
shocks cannot easily be diversified away, citizens of open economies demand 
more social spending from their governments when the external risk increases. 
Thus countries experiencing a greater volatility of their terms of trade should be 
observed to spend more on social needs than countries with less volatility. This 
hypothesis is also confirmed by the research of Rodrik. 
Taking the previous discussion into account, we specify an equation that relates 
social spending to competitiveness, terms of trade risk, and the GDP per capita: 
(1)  SSi = b0 + b1 Competitivenessi + b2 TOT(V)i + b3 GDPi; 
where SSi is social spending as a percentage of total GDP in country i; GDPi is 
GDP per capita in country  i,  TOT(V)i is the variability of the terms of trade of 
country i (measured as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean; expressed 
as percentage points); and mi is the error term. We added the term COMPi to the 
equation because as argued earlier there is a need to control for the possibility of   11 
a reverse causation, i.e. the possibility that countries which experience a high 
level of competitiveness acquire the means to invest in social security. We can 
refer to such causality as ‘a virtuous circle’. 
Our second equation explains competitiveness by social spending, level of GDP 
per capita and openness (OPENi is the openness of country i measured as the 
ratio of exports + imports to the total GDP, in percentage points). We add the 
variable ‘openness’ as an instrumental variable to as to satisfy the identification 
condition: 
(2)  Competitivenessi = a0 + a1 SSi + a2 GDPi + a3 Openi 
Combining the two equations, we obtain a system of two simultaneous equations. 
We use two indicators of competitiveness  – the IMD indicator and the WEF 
indicator. As a result we estimate two models, each consisting of two 
corresponding equations. 
System 1 (IMD): 
(3) 
0123 iiiii IMDSSGDPOpen aaaae =++++  
(4)  0000 () iiiii SSIMDtotVGDP bbbbm =++++  
 
System 2 (WEF): 
(5)  0123 iiiii WEFSSGDPOpen ggggx =++++  
(6)  0000 () iiiii SSWEFtotVGDP ddddn =++++  
 
We estimate this system using the Weighted Last Squares. The Weighted Least 
Squares method is advisable for estimation of data that consist of country 
observations (or any other type of observations that can be described as ‘one of 
the kind’) or for regressions subject to heteroskedasticity. 
The results are shown in Table 4 and Table 5. We find broadly the same effect of 
social spending on competitiveness in comparison to the single equation 
estimation procedures. Thus, when we take into account the different factors that 
influence social spending, and when we take into account the simultaneity 
between competitiveness and social spending, the latter variable continues to   12 
have a significant effect on competitiveness. Again, for both competitiveness 
indicators, signs of the estimates are the same, while the significance of the social 
spending variable is observed only for the WEF indicator. 
Note that contrary to Rodrik, we do not find that an increase in the volatility of the 
terms of trade increases social spending. We come back to this problem in the 
next section where we  develop a theoretical model linking risk and social 
spending. 
 
Table 4: Simultaneous equations estimation (IMD) 
Estimation Method: Iterative Weighted Least Squares 
Determinant residual covariance: 2007.296 
IMDi = a0 + a1 SSi + a2 GDPi + a3 Openi  Observations: 20 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  38.604  7.9304  4.8679  0.0000 
social spending  -0.1307  0.2743  -0.4764  0.6371 
GDP p.c.  -0.0006  0.0002  -2.6878  0.0115 
Openness 1990-2000  -0.0690  0.0573  -1.2047  0.2374 
R-squared  0.3402  Mean dependent var  15.850 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2165  S.D. dependent var  9.4581 
S.E. of regression  8.3718  Sum squared resid  1121.4 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.2554     
SSi = b0 + b1 IMDi + b2 TOT(V)i + b3 GDPi  Observations: 19 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  18.611  6.5293  2.8504  0.0077 
Competitiveness  0.0215  0.1613  0.1329  0.8951 
TOT Variability  -2.0344  0.6774  -3.0032  0.0052 
GDP p.c. 1997  0.0005  0.0002  2.1382  0.0405 
R-squared  0.3966  Mean dependent var  24.326 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2759  S.D. dependent var  6.9617 
S.E. of regression  5.9239  Sum squared resid  526.39 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.3486     
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Table 5: Simultaneous equations estimation (WEF) 
Estimation Method: Iterative Weighted Least Squares 
Determinant residual covariance: 1723.873 
WEFi = g0 + g1 SSi + g2 GDPi + g3 Openi   Observations: 20 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  41.617  7.1175  5.8471  0.0000 
social spending  -0.4809  0.2462  -1.9536  0.0598 
GDP p.c.  -0.0007  0.0002  -3.5634  0.0012 
Openness 1990-2000  0.0224  0.0514  0.4357  0.6660 
R-squared  0.5058  Mean dependent var  13.449 
Adjusted R-squared  0.4131  S.D. dependent var  9.8082 
S.E. of regression  7.5138  Sum squared resid  903.32 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.7468     
SSi = d0 + d1 WEFi + d2 TOT(V)i + d3 GDPi   Observations: 19 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  23.208  7.3511  3.1570  0.0035 
Competitiveness  -0.1186  0.1809  -0.6556  0.5169 
TOT Variability  -1.7789  0.7027  -2.5313  0.0167 
GDP p.c. 1997  0.0003  0.0002  1.2972  0.2041 
R-squared  0.4094  Mean dependent var  24.326 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2912  S.D. dependent var  6.9617 
S.E. of regression  5.8607  Sum squared resid  515.22 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.2589     
 
5. Some theoretical issues 
We noted in the previous section that the empirical relation between the terms of 
trade risk and social spending is not significant, while the relation between the 
social spending and competitiveness measures is noticeable. In this section we 
develop a simple theoretical model and we argue that, on theoretical grounds, 
there is no reason to expect that an increase in terms of trade risk should lead to 
a reallocation of resources to the social sector. We also show that, if any 
reallocation occurs, it is likely to be affected by the external effects caused by the 
social spending and its impact on the productivity in the private sector. 
To analyse the relationship between the terms of trade risk, social spending and 
competitiveness, we use a simple static model. Consider an open economy 
producing two goods, a private and a public good, with a unit supply of labour,   14 
distributed between the public sector and the private sector. In the context of our 
discussion here, the public good consists of social services produced by the 
government, i.e. social security (pension, unemployment insurance, health care, 
etc.) and other social services (housing, child care, etc.). The revenue of the 
private sector is affected by a stochastic variable p (representing the terms of 
trade). p is distributed with mean mp and variance sp. The value of total output, 
expressed in units of the domestic (public) good, is equal to: 
(7)  ( ) ( ) 1 fxgx p -+  
where x is the amount of labour employed in the p ublic sector, and 1-x is the 
amount of labour employed in the private sector; f() and g() are the production 
functions of respectively the private and public goods, where f’ and g’ >0, and f’’ 
and g’’<0. 
We will also analyse a second version of the model in which we allow the public 
good (social services) to affect the production function of the private sector. The 
idea here is that the public good increases the productivity of workers in the 
private sector. Our empirical results confirm that such a positive externality may 
exist. We have: 
(8)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1, fxgxgx p Øø -+ ºß . 
The control variable is the fraction of the total labour resources used in the 
production of the public good. 
The utility function of a representative consumer is separable in the two goods, 
i.e. t he marginal utilities of consuming the private or the public good are 
independent. 
(9)  [ ] { } [ ] { } [ ] (1)()(1)() pg EUfxgxEUfxUgx pp -+=-+ . 
(10)  [ ] { } [ ] { } [ ] (1),()()(1),()() pg EUfxgxgxEUfxgxUgx pp ØøØø -+=-+ ºßºß . 
To find the optimal division of the total labour stock between the two sectors, we 
have to find x for which the expected utility is maximised. We calculate the first 
order conditions for both versions of the model. 
After rearranging, for model 1 we obtain:   15 









pp ØøØø -= ºßºß-
. 
For model 2 we obtain: 
(12)  ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( )








pp Øø ØøØø -= ºßºß ºß Øø --ºß
. 
‘E’ stands for expected, and all derivatives are calculated with respect to x. Values 
of  x that satisfy the first order conditions describe the optimal distribution of 
resources between the private and the public sectors. 
Let us now analyse what happens if the distribution of p changes. Assume that 
there occurs a mean-preserving spread in p (its variance increases, while the 
mean remains constant). This represents an increase in volatility in the terms of 
trade. The question that arises is whether such a change will move the resources 
towards the public sector, which is immune to international volatility; or whether it 
will result in even more labour being employed in the private sector.  
In order to answer this question we first analyze how the increase in the mean 
preserving spread in p affects pU’p [pf(..)] (from the left hand side of equation 11). 
There are two possible cases, which we show in Figure 5. The first case is when 
pU’p [pf(..)] is convex in p. It can be seen that in that case, the increase in volatility 
of  p  raises t he  expected marginal utility from the private good.  The reverse 
happens when the function is concave in p. 
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Figure 5: Effects of a mean-preserving spread in p on the expected marginal 
utility derived from the private good. 
 
 
From the right hand side of equation (11) we can see that in the convex case a 
mean preserving spread in p must lead to a decline in x. First of all we have to 
remember that it leads to an increase in the left-hand-side of the first order 
condition. Secondly, we notice that a decline in x increases the denominator and 
reduces the numerator of the right-hand-side of equation (11), and in so doing 
raises the expression. Thus, in this case (convex function), an increase in risk 
leads to a decline in resources channelled into the public sector. It can easily be 
deduced that in the concave case an increase in risk leads more resources to be 
channelled into the public sector. Thus, an increase in terms of trade risk has an 
ambiguous effect on the size of public sector. 
To determine the concavity or convexity of a function, we have to calculate its 
second derivative with respect to p. Therefore, we calculate: 
















Øø Øø - ºß ºß ; 
and check the conditions under which these are larger than zero (if the second 
derivative is larger than zero, then a function is convex with respect to a given 
variable). 
We calculate the second derivative only for the first model, since the derivation is 
identical for the both of them. The convexity condition  can then be written as   17 
follows (we discard the subscript of the utility function, p): 
(13)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
'''....2''....0 UffUff ppp ØøØø +> ºßºß  
By multiplying both sides by  p and dividing by  U’ (both of them positive) we 
obtain: 
(14)  ( )
( ) ( )
( )









ØøØø ºßºß +> . 
Some manipulations reveal that: 
(15)  ( )







pp --= ; 
where R denotes the relative risk aversion, defined as: 
(16)  ( )







p Øø =- ºß ; 
and where R’ is the first derivative of the relative risk aversion. 
Using the definition of the relative risk  aversion, we can rewrite the convexity 
condition as: 
(17)  ( ) '10 RRR p -+->. 
Let us assume that the relative risk aversion is constant (R’=0). The condition is 
reduced to  R>1. Therefore, if the representative consumer is sufficiently risk 
averse, an increase in the volatility of the terms of trade leads to a move of the 
resources towards the private sector, away from the volatility-proof public sector. 
However, if the consumers have low risk aversion R<1, an increase in the volatility 
of p will result in more resources employed by the public sector. 
These results may appear quite surprising. One intuitively expects that when the 
private (open) sector becomes riskier (in our case because of the terms of trade 
risk) it is always better to reallocate resources towards the less risky sector (in our 
case the domestic public sector). The results of Rodrik (1998) about risk and the 
size of governments have strengthened this intuition. It is, however, important to 
realize that economic theory does not allow us to conclude that increased risk in 
the open sector leads rational agents to desire a retrenchment into the domestic,   18 
less risky sector
4. 
The explanation of this counter-intuitive result is that an increase in risk has both a 
substitution and an income effect. The substitution effect is the one that comes to 
mind when an increase in risk is seen to lower the attractiveness of risky activities 
and leads agents to reduce these activities. The income effect, however, works in 
the opposite direction. When the risk in the open sector increases, the expected 
total utility of revenues from the open sector declines. This drop can be offset by 
increasing resources into the open sector. If the income effect dominates the 
substitution effect, the higher terms of trade risk leads agents to increase their 
productive efforts in the risky sector.  
It follows from the previous discussion that the question of whether an increase in 
the riskiness of the open sector leads to an expansion of the less risky public 
sector is an empirical issue.  
The next question we analyse is how the presence of the public good externality 
affects the issue of risk. Put differently, we analyse whether the reallocation of 
resources, which results from an increase in terms of trade risk, is higher (or 
lower) when the public good enters the production function of the private sector. It 
has to be remembered from our empirical analysis that such an externality exists, 
i.e. social spending increases the efficiency of the private sector contributing 
towards an increase in competitiveness. Thus, the issue that we analyse here is 
whether the presence of this effect has any bearing on how the increased risk, 
which could  be an aspect of the globalisation, affects  the  magnitude of the 
reallocation of resources. 
To start with, we calculate the derivatives with respect to x of the right-hand-sides 
of equations (11) and (12), which, as will be remembered, represent the first order 
conditions of models 1 and 2. Next, we compare their absolute values in order to 
investigate the magnitude of changes in  x that are necessary to restore the 
optimum after an increase in terms of trade risk. 
The derivative for the first model is: 
                                            
4 See Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) for the first systematic analysis of this proposition. See also De 
Grauwe (1988) who applied it to the problem of the exporter who faces increased exchange risk.    19 
(18) 











This derivative is negative since both f’(..) and g’(..), are positive, and f’’(..) and 
g’’(..) are negative. 
In the next step, we calculate the derivative for the second model. This yields: 
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It is reasonable to assume that D>0, because the strength of the direct effect of 
changes in  x is most likely larger than the strength of the indirect effect 
f’[g(x)]g’(x), occurring through changes in the public good. 
Rearranging yields: 
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; 
where f’[.]=f’[g(x)] and f’’[.]=f’’[g(x)]. 
By comparing equations (20) with (19) it can easily be seen that (20) is larger in 
absolute value than (19). Put differently – in order to produce a given change in 
the expected utility of the private output – the left hand sides of equations (11) and 
(12) – a smaller reallocation of labour is necessary after an increase in the terms-
of-trade risk. 
This result has an important implication for our discussion of the effects of an 
increase in the riskiness of the open sector. Suppose again that the riskiness of 
the open sector increases and that  R<1. In such a  case resources will be 
reallocated towards the closed, public sector. In the second model, where we take 
into account that the production of the public good has a positive effect on private 
output, this reallocation of labour towards the public sector will be less 
pronounced than i n the model where the public good does not raise private 
output.  
A similar conclusion holds when R>1. In that case an increase in risk leads to a 
reallocation of labour towards the open, private sector. Again, in the model where 
the public good increases private output, this reallocation will be less pronounced   20 
than in the model without this externality.  
More generally, when the risk in the private (open) sector increases, the existence 
of public goods, which positively affect private production, leads to a lesser need 
to reallocate resources from one sector to the other. To the extent that a 
reallocation of resources is costly, the existence of public goods, which increase 
the productivity of the private sector, makes the adjustment to the increased risk 
easier.  
In the context of our empirical results this could mean that countries that have 
invested a lot in social services and thus have improved their competitiveness, are 
better shielded from externally generated risk. When due to say, globalisation, the 
externally generated risk increases, in these countries there is a lower need to 
reallocate resources, which can be both costly and welfare-decreasing. 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
In the light of the claims of the anti-globalists, our empirical results are surprising. 
We find no evidence of a race to the bottom concerning social security in the 
industrialised world. On the contrary – we find that the rich countries that spend 
most on social needs rank highest, on average, in terms of competitiveness. 
Thus, social spending does not seem to hinder countries in their continuous battle 
for competitiveness. On the contrary, high social spending goes together with 
strong competitiveness. How can these surprising results be explained? 
There are two possible explanations – each one assuming a different direction in 
the causal relation between social spending and competitiveness. The first 
explanation lays the causality from competitiveness to social spending. It runs as 
follows. Countries that are highly competitive generate extra income. The latter in 
turn leads to a higher demand for social insurance which in democratic societies 
will lead governments to provide it. In this sense, strong competitiveness rewards 
nations to pay for more generous social services.  
We have taken care of this objection, first by relating the average competitiveness 
index during 1998-2002 or 1999-2001 to social spending preceding this period. By 
using this specification we have, in principle, excluded the causality going from 
competitiveness to social spending. Second, since in a cross-section there could 
be a residual reverse causation between competitiveness and social spending, we   21 
have used a simultaneous equations estimation procedure that corrects for the 
potential bias arising from reverse causation.  
A second explanation identifies the causality to go from social spending towards 
competitiveness. We argued that the competitiveness of a nation depends on the 
absence of prolonged social conflicts, the quality of government and domestic 
institutions, as well as the quality of human capital. It can be argued that the 
human capital of a nation is improved by a well-functioning system of social 
services. Such a system makes it possible for the workers to feel less insecure, 
and gives them a feeling of belonging to the system. Such a sense of belonging 
leads to stable societies with a strong sense of cohesion. In addition, a well-
functioning system of social services may lead people to be willing to take more 
risk in starting new risky projects, knowing that failure will not condemn them to 
poverty. In short, a well-functioning social system creates a ‘risk-taking social 
capital’ that ultimately leads to an improvement of the productivity of a nation.  
In addition, as pointed out by p olitical scientists, a degree of complementarity 
between markets and governments is necessary for achieving and sustaining a 
relatively conflict-free society. The latter is essential to be competitive. Thus, our 
results suggest that when countries invest in social services they also develop 
institutions capable of generating conflict-free societies. This then creates the 
necessary condition for achieving high levels of competitiveness. Thus countries 
with well-developed social service systems have little to fear from the “race-to-the-
bottom” danger.  
Finally we interpreted our findings in the framework of a theoretical model in which 
risk affects the size of the social sector and in which social spending affects the 
production function of the private sector. We concluded that countries that have 
invested a lot in social services and thus have improved their competitiveness, are 
better shielded from externally generated risk. In these countries there is a lower 
need to reallocate resources when due to, say, globalisation, the externally 
generated risk increases. Our theoretical analysis also allows us to conclude that 
increased terms of trade risk does not necessarily lead to an increase in the 
demand for social security. This theoretical ambiguity may explain why it is difficult 
to find a robust relationship between external risk and the size of the social sector.  
More research will have to be done to detect the nature of the causality between   22 
competitiveness and social spending. It will be important to analyse the conditions 
under which social spending leads to increased competitiveness. One channel 
seems obvious – the efficiency with which governments provide social services. In 
countries where governments are efficient, the taxes paid by employers and 
employees are transformed into social services whose value exceeds the value of 
these taxes. In such countries workers and employers will feel satisfied and it will 
be likely that productivity is positively affected. Conversely, in countries with 
inefficient governments the taxes are transformed into social services with low 
value. As a result, frustration and lack of motivation will be the result. Thus, the 
key is an efficient government, capable of transforming social security 
contributions into social value added. The countries that manage to organise such 
a transformation successfully are likely to gain in terms of competitiveness.  
Our analysis leads to an interesting insight into the link between globalisation and 
governance. Globalisation puts pressure on nations to be competitive. According 
to our results, one way governments can improve competitiveness of the nation is 
to improve the efficiency of government institutions. Such an improvement allows 
taxpayers’ money to be transformed into valuable collective services, which in turn 
improve the productivity and the competitiveness of the nation, and make the 
country better able to absorb externally generated risk. In a way globalisation 
works like Adam Smith’s invisible hand. It forces governments to be efficient, even 
if they do not like this
5. Those who succeed improve the competitiveness of their 
country and are rewarded by more welfare for their citizens; those who fail reduce 
productivity and competitiveness, and are punished by less welfare for their 
citizens. In this sense, globalisation can force governments to be more 
responsible to the needs of their citizens. 
 
                                            
5In a recent paper Bonaglia, de Macedo, and Bussolo (2001) show that increases in import 
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Competitiveness Input Factors: 
1.  Economic Performance (74 criteria): Macro-economic evaluation of the 
domestic economy.  
2.  Government Efficiency (84 criteria): Extent to which government policies are 
conducive to competitiveness.  
3.  Business Efficiency (66 criteria): Extent to which enterprises are performing in 
an innovative, profitable and responsible manner.  
4.  Infrastructure (90 criteria): Extent to which basic, technological, scientific and 
human resources meet the needs of business.   25 
Rankings by IMD: overall, domestic economic performance, government efficiency 
  Overall  Domestic economic performance  Government efficiency 
  02  01  00  99  98  mean  02  01  00  99  98  mean  02  01  00  99  98  mean 
Australia  14  11  10  11  12  11.6  27  28  24  20  17  23.2  9  5  6  6  7  7 
Austria  13  14  15  18  24  16.8  16  27  18  17  19  19.4  15  11  15  14  17  14 
Belgium  18  17  19  21  23  19.6  5  10  12  12  10  9.8  29  25  25  27  34  28 
Canada  8  9  8  10  8  8.6  14  12  11  11  11  11.8  10  10  12  15  13  12 
Denmark  6  15  13  9  10  10.6  12  32  31  37  25  27.4  8  13  11  11  12  11 
Finland  2  3  4  5  6  4  18  33  22  23  20  23.2  2  2  2  3  10  4 
France  22  25  22  23  22  22.8  8  11  9  8  14  10  32  34  27  30  28  30 
Germany  15  12  11  12  15  13  4  5  4  3  6  4.4  26  18  22  21  21  22 
Greece  36  30  34  32  33  33  38  39  38  31  28  34.8  40  33  35  36  44  38 
Iceland  12  13  9  13  18  13  43  42  37  35  41  39.6  11  9  9  17  18  13 
Ireland  10  7  5  8  7  7.4  10  6  3  10  9  7.6  5  3  5  9  3  5 
Italy  32  32  32  30  31  31.4  21  25  16  16  21  19.8  39  40  43  40  38  40 
Japan  30  26  24  24  20  24.8  29  16  17  13  5  16  31  29  28  29  33  30 
Luxembourg  3  4  6  3  3  3.8  2  2  2  2  2  2  7  7  10  4  6  7 
Netherlands  4  5  3  4  4  4  9  8  6  6  7  7.2  12  12  4  7  8  9 
New Zealand  19  21  18  17  17  18.4  26  34  28  34  37  31.8  16  17  13  8  4  12 
Norway  17  20  17  16  11  16.2  30  26  33  25  18  26.4  18  23  16  18  9  17 
Portugal  33  34  29  27  29  30.4  28  35  20  14  31  25.6  34  32  26  25  26  29 
Spain  23  23  23  20  26  23  13  22  21  22  27  21  20  21  20  12  22  19 
Sweden  11  8  14  14  16  12.6  17  17  19  15  26  18.8  14  14  19  24  23  19 
Switzerland  7  10  7  7  9  8  11  14  14  9  12  12  6  6  7  5  11  7 
Turkey  46  44  42  38  39  41.8  49  49  47  46  46  47.4  46  49  40  39  39  43 
UK  16  19  16  19  13  16.6  6  9  7  5  8  7  22  24  17  20  16  20 
USA  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  3  8  8  10  5  7 
Correlation with overall ranking  0.65  0.58  0.56  0.45  0.63  0.59  0.93  0.93  0.92  0.88  0.86  1 
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Rankings by IMD: Infrastructure, business efficiency 
  Infrastructure  Business efficiency 
  02  01  00  99  98  mean  02  01  00  99  98  mean 
Australia  12  6  8  11  9  9  15  14  14  14  18  15 
Austria  10  11  14  19  23  15  12  12  17  23  25  18 
Belgium  18  18  20  21  21  20  20  18  18  18  21  19 
Canada  6  8  10  9  4  7  5  11  9  11  7  9 
Denmark  8  13  11  8  5  9  6  9  8  4  4  6 
Finland  2  2  2  2  3  2  3  2  3  3  2  3 
France  19  22  22  22  19  21  26  24  22  24  20  23 
Germany  11  10  9  10  15  11  21  15  15  20  22  19 
Greece  33  26  31  30  26  29  32  26  29  26  34  29 
Iceland  4  4  4  4  8  5  4  4  5  8  9  6 
Ireland  23  15  16  20  13  17  8  7  4  9  6  7 
Italy  31  28  30  27  28  29  29  27  30  27  30  29 
Japan  16  19  15  14  17  16  35  30  26  32  29  30 
Luxembourg  13  12  12  12  14  13  7  6  7  5  8  7 
Netherlands  9  7  5  6  7  7  2  3  2  2  3  2 
New Zealand  15  21  19  18  18  18  22  22  23  16  16  20 
Norway  14  20  13  15  10  14  19  20  16  13  12  16 
Portugal  29  33  27  26  27  28  36  35  36  33  37  35 
Spain  25  25  24  23  25  24  24  23  24  22  24  23 
Sweden  3  3  7  7  11  6  10  5  12  17  14  12 
Switzerland  5  9  6  5  6  6  14  13  11  15  13  13 
Turkey  39  35  33  31  31  34  41  33  32  30  26  32 
UK  21  23  23  24  22  23  17  21  19  21  15  19 
USA  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
  0.87  0.92  0.9  0.86  0.88  1  0.95  0.94  0.94  0.89  0.88  1   27 
 
Ranking by WEF 
  01  00  99  mean 
Australia  9  10  13  10.67 
Austria  13  13  11  12.33 
Belgium  14  12  15  13.67 
Canada  11  11  8  10.00 
Denmark  8  6  7  7.00 
Finland  1  1  2  1.33 
France  12  15  9  12.00 
Germany  4  3  6  4.33 
Greece  43  33  36  37.33 
Iceland  16  17  22  18.33 
Ireland  22  22  17  20.33 
Italy  24  24  25  24.33 
Japan  15  14  14  14.33 
Netherlands  3  4  3  3.33 
New Zealand  20  19  16  18.33 
Norway  19  20  18  19.00 
Portugal  31  28  29  29.33 
Spain  23  23  23  23.00 
Sweden  6  7  4  5.67 
Switzerland  5  5  5  5.00 
Turkey  33  29  31  31.00 
UK  7  8  10  8.33 
USA  2  2  1  1.67 
 
 
 
 